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The American Interpretation of the
Most Favored Nation Clause*
EuGENE J. CoNRoY
A good many articles and a good many books have been written
on the most favored nation clause, and nearly all of the authors
devote the major part of their labors to the conditional interpretation:
the European writers to showing its absurdity and utter lack of
justification; the early American writers to condoning it; and the
later American writers to condemning it.L None of these writers,
however, have attempted to show the nature of this apparently
aberrant form of the clause, or to explain why it ever came into
existence. There is an old proverb which says that where there is
much smoke, there is at least a little fire, which is applicable to this
problem, for it would seem that nothing as wrong and valueless, as
the conditional form of the clause is claimed to be by the European
and later American writers, could ever have received the vigorous
and faithful support that that form of the clause has received from
the American State Department. Before we go into the conditional
clauses, however, it would perhaps be well to say a few words about
the clause in general.
The most favored nation clause is the collective term used to desig-
nate a group of provisions found in most commercial treaties pro-
viding that the nationals of the contracting parties wlll receive
treatment in the territories of the other at least as favorable as that
*This article is the result of a report prepared under the direction of Dean
C. K. Burdick of the Cornell Law School for Hon. George W. Wickersham, for
his use as member of the Commission of Jurists for the Progressive Codification
of International Law.
'The following list is aselect bibliography of theclause. It is not exhaustive, but
contains all the more valuabletreatises: CALWER, DIE MEISTBEGUNSTIGUNG DER
VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON NORDAMERIKA (1902); CAVARETTA, LA CLAUSOLA
DELLA NAZIONE LA PIU FAVORITA (i906); CULBERTSON, INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC POLICIES (1925); GLiER, DIE MEISTBEGUNSTIGUNGSKLAUSEL (1905);
HEROD, MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT (i9OI); HERRERA, LA CLAUSULA
DELANAcIONMAsFAORECIDA (1926); Hornbeck, The Most Favored Nation Clause
in Commercial Treaties, WISCONSIN UNIVERSITY BULLETIN, 1908, ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE No. 6 (2), and in 3 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 395, 619, 797 (I908); McClure, A New American Commercial Policy, Columbia
University Dissertation, 1924, No. 173 (1924); SCHRAUT, SYSTEM DER HANDELs-
VERTRAGE UND DIE MESIT3EGUNSTIGUNG (1884); UNITED STATES TARIFF CoM-
MISSION, RECIPROCITY AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES (I919); Viner, The American
Interpretation of the Most Favored Nation Clause, 32 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 10 (1923); Visser, La Clause de la Nation la plus Favorisge dans les
Traitis de Commerce, 4 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, II s6rie (1902); VON
MELLE, DIE MEISTBEGUNSTIGUNGSKLAUSEL, IN HOLTZENDORPF'S HANDBUCH DES
VOLKERRECnTS (1889).
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granted to third nations. The chief object of commercial treaties is,
naturally, to secure to each of the contracting parties as many
advantages from the other as it is possible to get, and so, for the
most part, commercial treaties are made up of specific provisions
setting out the definite concessions which the parties are willing to
make. Along with these special provisions, however, it has been
found to be essential to include others which guarantee that the
favors secured by the treaty will not be rendered less valuable by
the granting of greater favors to another nation. These clauses all
tend in the end to prevent discrimination, for if all nations have
them in their treaties with each other, the nationals of all foreign
countries must be treated alike in the territory of any one country.
There are two forms of these discrimination-preventing clauses: those
providing for national treatment, and those providing for most
favored nation treatment.
A national treatment clause provides that the nationals of each
country shall be treated in the territories of the other just as if
they were native citizens; in other words, it promises that there will
be no discrimination at all. This is the usual form of clause govern-
ing shipping and navigation, and has been used extensively, though
sporadically, in most of the other fields covered by commercial
treaties.2 A good example of this form of the clause:'
"No other or higher duties or charges shall be imposed in any
of the ports of the United States on British vessels than those
payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States; nor in
the ports of His Brittanic Majesty's territories in Europe on the
vessels of the United States than shall be payable in the same
ports on British vessels."
A most favored nation clause provides that the nationals of each
country will be treated in the territories of the other just as well as
the nationals of any foreign country; in other words, it pr6mises that
there will be no discrimination among foreigners. This is the usual
form of the clause governing tariffs and the importation and exporta-
tion of merchandise; though it is also used extensively in other fields
as a sort of residuary clause: everything not granted national treat-
2For a fuller discussion, see UNITED STATES TARIFF CoMMiSSIoN, HANDBooK
OF COMMERCuI TREATIES, in the introduction, p. 5; and Culbertson, op. cit.,
Ch. II.3Treaty, United States-Great Britain, 1815. All treaties to which the United
States is a party may be found in MALLOY'S AMERICAN TREATIES, SENATE
DOCUMENTS 47-48, 6zst Cong. 2nd Sess., arranged alphabetically by countries.
All other treaties are to be found in DE MARTENS, REcEUIL DES TRAITES, or,
after 1921, in the League of Nations Treaty Series.
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ment is usually covered by a most favored nation clause. A fairly
representative though simple form of the clause:4
"No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation
into the United States of any article, the produce or manufacture
of the dominions of His Majesty the King of Denmark; and no
higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into
the said dominions of any article, the produce or manufacture of
the United States, than are or shall be payable on the like articles,
being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country."
As has been said, the most favored nation clause is a sort of
residual clause covering all favors not otherwise provided for; but
the chief purpose in practice, and the only purpose of any importance,
is to govern tariff relations. It may be said safely that ninety-five
per cent of the claims made under the clause are for reductions of
tariff, and in practically all the works on the clause, only that aspect
is given serious consideration. For all practical purposes, then, the
most favored nation clause may be characterized as the international
governor of tariffs.
From a legal standpoint, the generic term most favored nation
clause is somewhat misleading, for, as was intimated above, it is not
a clause, but a group of provisions. There is no fixed form, and it
rarely occurs in even a single treaty in a single definite article. The
usual thing is to tack on to a number of articles containing specific
concessions, a provision that with respect to the subject matter of
that concession the promising nation will not grant greater favors
to a third nation; and then to add a covering clause, either at the end
or beginning of the treaty, providing that all favors granted to
another country will be granted to the other contracting party.
The clause may, therefore, appear in any number of articles in the
same treaty: occasionally there is only a covering clause; 5 usually
there is a covering clause and from half-a-dozen to a dozen specific
clauses; in a treaty like the Versailles treaty the number begins to
read like the war debt, for in that treaty there is a specific most
favored nation clause in practically every article from Art. 26o to
Art. 38o. 6 The most usual subjects for the specific clauses are the
ordinary ones of commercial intercourse: duties on imports and
exports, shipping taxes, and rights of travel and business.7
It will be readily seen, therefore, that the variety of forms in
which the clause may appear is indeed infinite, since it may be
4United States-Denmark, Treaty of 1826, Art. IV.5United States-Belgium, Treatyof 1875; United States-Japan, Treatyof 1854.
'See also, Japan-Greece, Treaty of 1899; Japan-Ecuador, Treaty of 1918.7HORNBECK, op. cit., supra note I, 9.
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
limited or described in any way the contracting parties desire. As a
generalization, it may be said that a limitation attached to a most
favored nation clause may consist of any stipulation of which the
parties are capable of contracting; but as a practical matter, most
limitations are of three classes: either as to subject matter, as to the
geographical districts to which they are to apply, or as to the political
units to which they are to apply. The clauses limited as to subject
matter are the specific clauses we have been discussing above: they
form perhaps eighty or ninety per cent of the total body of most
favored nation clauses, but they are not especially significant, for
their meaning is clear if the contracting parties have been careful
enough to express themselves clearly. The clauses limited as to
geographical districts are also fairly common: the national treatment
clause quoted above is a good example-limited to "His Majesty's
ports in Europe" 8 -or the clause in the Louisiana Cession Treaty
mentioned hereafter-limited to "ports in the ceded territory."9 The
other class consists of those clauses which except from the operation
of the clause, relations with certain peculiarly friendly countries.
For instance, Norway and Sweden usually except from their clauses
favors granted to Finland or to each other; England excepts favors
granted to her dominions; the United States excepts favors granted
to Cuba; and most of the South American states except favors
granted to each other. But on the whole, though limited clauses
comprise nearly ninety per cent of all most favored nation clauses,
they are relatively unimportant from a historical or legal standpoint,
for each is an individual provision, different from all the others, and
depending for its interpretation only on the clearness of its wording.
Another characterization, which divides the clause into two fields,
is the characterization as unilateral or reciprocal. This is a simple
distinction: if only one party promises not to discriminate, the
clause is unilateral; if the promises are mutual, the clause is bilateral
or reciprocal. The latter is the regular form; the unilateral clause
is exceptional, and its presence indicates a position of hopeless
inferiority in the promisor nation. It is either so weak in a military
way that it is not able to get any sort of consideration, as were
Germany and Austria after the World War; or so weak in an eco-
nomic way that it makes little difference whether or not it gets any
consideration, as were the Barbary States in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries; or it may be both, as are states like Korea,
Siam or Afghanistan. But wherever this form of the clause appears,
sSupra note 3.9United States-France, Treaty of I8o3, Art. VIII. Infra note 29.
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it is always treated as distinctly irregular, and as an exception to the
general practice of the state securing it. In practice it is nearly
always unlimited and unconditional, though occasional limited
unilateral clauses are found,' 0 and at least one conditional unilateral
clause has been concluded, between Korea and the United States
in 1882."
The third, last, and most important characterization which may
be used to divide most favored nation clauses into classes is the
distinction between clauses which are conditional and those which
are unconditional. In the examples which we have given above,
only indefinite or nonconditional clauses have been used-in the
express forms the distinction is clearly brought out. An expressly
unconditional clause provides that every favor extended by one
contracting party to a third party shall be immediately and un-
conditionally extended to the other party; the expressly conditional
form provides that every favor extended by one contracting party
shall be extended to the other party "freely, if the concession was
freely made, or on allowing the same compensation, if the concession
was conditional." A typical expressly unconditional clause: 2
"Also every favor or immunity which shall be later granted
to a third power shall beimmediately extended and without condi-
tion, and by this very fact, to the other contracting party."
A typical expressly conditional clause:13
"The most Christian King and the United States engage
mutually not to grant any particular favor to other nations, in
respect to commerce and navigation, which shall not-immediatelybecome common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same
favor, freely, if the concession was freely made, or on' allowing
the same compensation, if the concession was conditional."
All most favored nation clauses, however, are not either expressly
conditional or expressly unconditional. Either through carelessness,
or through a desire to compromise between conflicting views as to
the wording of the clause, the actual wording of a large numberof
clauses is left indefinite or ambiguous. They may be divided into,
two classes, however; one of which is nonconditional, and should
always be interpreted as unconditional; and the other of which is.
equivocal, and may be interpreted as conditional, thoughjwith
doubtful propriety. The nonconditonal clauses simply state that no,
higher or other duties will be levied on the products of the contracting
"
0Great Britain-Japan, Treaty of 1854.
"United States Tariff Commission, op. cit. supra note 1, 392.
"2United States-Serbia, Treaty of i88I, Art. VI.
13United States-France, 1778, Art. II.
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parties than on the products of any other foreign country. A good
example of this type of clause:' 4
"No other or higher duties shall be paid by Americans on
goods imported into Japan than are fixed by this treaty, nor shall
any higher duties be paid by Americans than are levied on the
same description of goods if imported in Japanese vessels or the
vessels of any other nation."
There seems to be no conceivable reason why this clause should not
be interpreted as meaning just exactly what it says. It is very clear
-a promise that a certain act will not be done. To attach to such
a promise a condition that the act will not be done if the promisee
nation is willing to pay for the immunity as occasion arises in the
future wculd seem to be utterly unreasonable and opposed to all
honor and good faith.
The equivocal clauses are those clauses which provide for "most
favored nation treatment" or "treatment as favorable as that
accorded the most favored nation." As a matter of logic, it will
be recognized that these clauses provide for the maintenance of a
standard in place of providing for the performance of specific acts.
In order properly to interpret the clauses, therefore, it is necessary
to determine what is meant by "most favored nation treatment."
The key word in the phrase is, of course, "favor." in English,
whatever the words which translate it connote in other languages,
"favor" carries a meaning of gratuity, of an advantage rendered
without compensation. Therefore, if a nation has paid for an ad-
vantage received, it has not been favored, and the advantage could
not come within the most favored nation clause. That is the Ameri-
can argument.15 On the other hand, it may be argued that an ad-
vantage is a favor, no matter how it is received: that a nation may
grant another a favor gratuitously, or for compensation. Therefore,
when an advantage has been rendered, the nation has been favored,
and the third nation may claim it without rendering compensation.
That is the argument of the rest of the world."5
14United States-Japan, 1878, Art. H.
151nfra, p. 26. See also AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. V,
i5O et seg., 642 et seq., for a fuller statement of these arguments. See also HEROD,
op. cit. supra note I, 8-27; HORNBECK, op. cit. supra note 1, 31 et seq.; VINER,
op. cit. supra note I. Of course, all the American writers have developed the
subject.
"6"En appliquant cette clause, il faut donc examiner de quel traitement les
inter~ts de ce troisiame 6tat jouissent dans le pays 6tranger et r~clamer le mgme
traitment pour ses propres inter8ts du mime genre. Alors, si ce tiers poss~de un
certain traitement favoris6, il import peu aux autres de quelles concessions ont
dt6 accordaes en dchange. Une autre argument 6tait qu'un avantage accord6 5.
un troisi~me dtat en 6change d'une autre concession n'6tait pas une 'favour'
mais 'a mere act of reciprocity', et que ceux qui jouissaient par consequent d'un
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It would seem that the American side of the argument is much
the stronger from the standpoint of strict logic; but the attitude of
the American government in so interpreting these clauses, when for
two hundred years the rest of the world had been giving them the
opposite meaning, does not seem very defensible, especially since
this interpretation was used to enable the United States to evade
promises which it must have known were made with the opposite
interpretation in mind.
A difficult question is raised when one of these indefinite clauses
is contained in the same treaty with an expressly conditional or
unconditional covering clause. Which will govern? The situation
rises in practice only when a nation is claiming a reduction in tariffs
under a nonconditional clause dealing with tariff rates, and when
there is an expressly conditional covering clause in the same treaty.
The situation has been sharply debated several times, and the result
has been that the general language controls the specific; since the
general clause refers to all favors, while the specific refers only to
tariff rates, the former includes the latter, and therefore controls.
This seems to be somewhat doubtful, but is clearly the law.17
The effect of an unconditional clause is to extend automatically
and without compensation every favor granted to another nation,
no matter what the circumstances; of a conditional clause, to except
from the operation of the clause all favors obtained by granting an
equivalent-that is, by bargain or reciprocity agreement-except on
the payment of a like consideration. To illustrate: suppose that
France and Argentine have a most favored nation agreement. Argen-
tine grants to the United States in return for a reduction of the tariff
rate on hides, let us say, a reduction in certain grades of American
tel avantage n'6taient pas des 'most favored nations.' Cela serait une raison
d6j& suffisante pour ne pas appliquer la clause en question. I1 est presque superflu
de d~montrer qu'un tel raisonnement n'est qu'un jeu de mots. I1 s'agit seulement
de savoir, nous ravons d6jh dit, si les interats, d'un troisi me 6tat jouissent dane
un certain pays d'un meillieur traitement que ceux d'autre pays. I1 est tout h
fait indifferent k ces autres 6tats si on appelle 'faveur' ou bien 'reciprocit6' le
fait dont un troisi~me 6tat fait d&iver son traitement plus avantageuse." VISSER,
op. cit. supra note I, 273. See also, GLIER, op. cit. supra note i, 10-17; and
SCHRAUT, op. cit. supra note I, 30.1 7
"Der Wortlaut des Art. IX musste es immer als eine Sisiphusarbeit erscheinen
lassen, in unseren Vertrag mit der Union die schrankenlose, unbedingte Meist-
begrinstigung ffir die deutsche Einffthr in die Vereinigten Staaten hineinzudeuten;
und mit Recht konnte der amerikanische Staatssekretdr der deutschen Regierung
gegenfiber sein Bedaueren dardiber zum Ausdrfick bringen, dassdiese 'dem Art.
IX jede Kraft und Wirkung neben dem Art. V abspreche.' . . . Es kann aber
trotzdem mit dem besten Willen nicht angezweifelt werden, dass Art. IX mit
dem Art. Vim Zusammenhang steht, und dass wir auf Grund des Vertrages vore
Jahre 1828 die schrankenl6se Meistbegfinstigung von den Vereinigten Staaten
nie beanspruchen konnten." GLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 244. See also HoRN-
BECK, op. cit. supra note I, 29, 36-37; VINER, op. cit. supra note i, 114.
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steel products. France claims for her steel the benefit of the reduction,
under the most favored nation clause. If the clause be construed as
conditional, Argentine need grant the reduction in steel only if
France renders the same equivalent that the United States has given-
a reduction in Argentine hides. Or, if France imports no hides and
Argentine decides that the same compensation is not equivalent,
France will have to give additional compensation until Argentine
considered the transaction equal. But if the clause be unconditional,
Argentine will have to extend the favor purchased from the United
States to France for nothing, and wait for her compensation until
she can claim freely a favor which some other nation has purchased
from France. It will be seen that there is an equivalent extended
in each case: with the conditional form of the clause it is immediate
and specific; with the unconditional form it works out by general
averages over long periods of time.
The fact that the words that distinguish the conditional form,
"freely, if freely made, or on allowing the same compensation, if
conditional" are in the form of a condition, is unfortunate, for it
has given a name to that form of the clause which is misleading.
A condition is usually a limitation attached to some provision, and
the condition in the most favored nation clause has been so considered-
as a specialized form of limitation which by reason of its importance
was given the dignity of a separate classification. From this con-
ception it follows that the unconditional form is to be regarded as the
simple, elemental, basic form of the clause, and that the conditional
form is the result of the addition of a conditional limitation to the
originally unconditional form of the clause; and from this the con-
clusion is reached that the conditional form is no more than an
aberrant form originally conceived by men untrained in the law of
nations and maintained by short-sighted stubborness against all
reason. This is actually the attitude of the majority of writers on
the clause.
But if the clause be carefully studied, it becomes evident that the
words of the so-called condition are not words of limitation at all,
but words of description only; that instead of attaching a condition
to be satisfied before most favored nation treatment will be granted,
they are really distinguishing between two methods of according
most favored nation treatment.
Treaties generally, and commercial treaties especially, are business
transactions, not deeds of gift. Each of the concessions granted in
a commercial treaty is granted for an adequate consideration (pro-
vided, of course, there is no duress). The most favored nation clause
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is no more than a general promise of a class of favors, and we must,
therefore, expect to find consideration for it as well as for any of the
simpler favors. That is the purpose of the form of the clause as
conditional or unconditional-to provide for the payment of the
consideration, and to describe the method of payment. It is no more
significant than the clauses of a land contract, or of an ordinary
contract of sale,which provide for the amount and the manner of
payment of the consideration. If the clause is conditional, payment
must be cash down, or C. 0. D. If the clause is unconditional, pay-
ment is deferred until the nation granting the favor has an oppor-
tunity to strike a balance by obtaining another favor from the nation
which received the first favor. The conditional clause is comparable
to a simple barter, or sale for cash. The unconditional form is
analagous to the complicated modem system of a great number of
sales on credit among a great number of parties: at the end of each
month, or year, or whatever period is set, the settlement is made.
The bills of exchange cancel each other, and everyone is paid without
the transfer of any appreciable quantity of cash.
It is obvious, therefore, that the clauses are the same in principle:
just as a sale is a sale, no matter how the consideration is to be paid,
so is a most favored nation clause a most favored nation clause, no
matter how the consideration is to be paid. Neither form is more
naturally or more purely a most favored nation clause than the
other. Of course, it is true that the conditional form is characteristic
of a cruder and more primitive state of international economy than
is the unconditional, just as a sale by barter is considered to be more
characteristic of a savage than of a highly civilized people; but this
is not true of the clause itself, for the different forms are the same
in principle, no matter what the circumstances in which they appear.
From this it appears at least reasonable to believe that in certain
circumstances, the conditional form of the most favored nation
clause is the only feasible, or perhaps the only possible, form of the
clause to use, just as in certain states of human society, sales by barter
or strictly cash are the only feasible or only possible forms of sale.
It is equally reasonable to believe that in certain other circumstances,
the unconditional form of the clause is the only feasible, or even the
only possible, form of the clause to use, just as in modem commerce
practically all sales of any size at all are on credit-it is impossible
to carry on modern business on a cash basis. Just what are the
circumstances under which an unconditional form is desirable, and
what are the circumstances under which the conditional form is
desirable?
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In the first place, it should be said that the unconditional form of
the clause is much quicker, more efficient, and satisfactory to all
concerned if it will work. The claiming of a favor under the con-
ditional clause necessitates a great deal of negotiation: first, to de-
temline whether or not the favor was gratuitous or for compensation;
if so, whether the rendering of the same compensation will be equiva-
lent; if not, what will be a sufficient consideration; and finally the
claimant nation must enact the legislation necessary to carry out its
part of the bargain. This may take years, and in the meanwhile
the original situation may have long since disappeared-in some
instances the final settlement has been like paying for a horse which
is not only dead, but has gone a long way toward becoming a fossil.
The unconditional form, on the other hand, is automatic; in most
cases the favor is extended as a matter of course, without even the
formality of a request; in any event, it is never more than a very
short time before each individual case is settled. The unconditional
clause is, therefore, the more desirable whenever it will work, and
the question becomes: when does the unconditional form of the clause
cease to work fairly? For, of course, there are times and circumstances
during which it will not work, just as the modern credit system will
break down in some circumstances-as it did in Germany and
Russia when their currency inflation bubbles were reaching their
greatest size, and most ordinary transactions were carried on by
simple barter.
The answer is to be found in the method of operation of the
unconditional clause. It works by suspending payment, and then,
after a considerable period of time, striking a balance for each nation
between favors received and favors granted: that is, it proceeds on
the theory that during a considerable period of time, each of a group
of nations will receive about as many favors as it is required to give.
Thus, if ten nations all have most favored nation relations with each
other, and each nation grants ten favors in a year, on the average
each nation will probably receive ten favors during each year. A
balance is thus maintained and everyone is even.
But if there are one or two, or eight or nine, of the nations in the
group which are not granting favors at all, but which are continuing
to receive all the favors all the other nations are continuing to give,
a dangerous situation is inevitable. One or two nations are getting
everything and paying nothing, and trouble is sure to follow. This
situation is a direct result of the unconditional form of the clause.
Another case in which the unconditional form is unsatisfactory is
where, in a period of high nationalistic feeling, when there are unsur-
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mountable tariff barriers everywhere, and no reductions are being
granted by anybody, a nation or group of nations undertakes to
compel the other nations to lower their tariffs. The only feasible
method of doing this is for the crusading nation to raise its barriers
to a prohibitive height, and then offer to lower them if the other
nations will do the same. It is substantially the same policy as
that which the United States has been pursuing with regard to naval
disarmament-a threat to build a big fleet, and then a promise not
to do so in return for similar promises from the others. Under an
unconditional most favored nation clause system this will not work
at all, for it will take the sacrifice of all of the liberal nation's tariff
wall to effect the removal of one tariff wall of the conservative
nations. The other conservatives will receive the benefit of both
reductions and will have given nothing. [Of course, there is a great
deal of doubt as to whether in fact they would receive any benefit,
since, if they shut out the trade from other countries, they could
not for very long continue to take advantage of the removal of the
tariff barriers in those other countries, and their supposed advantage
would in reality come to mean nothing. But since in practice the
aggressive nation would dispense one-tenth of its favors to each of
the other nations, and receive one-tenth of its consideration from
each of them, the situation is greatly obscured. At any rate legis-
latures and those who control them do not generally consider the
inner workings of the instruments they use, and the real facts are
rarely known, so the advantage seems very real. In many cases, of
course, it is real; and for the purposes of this paper, it may be taken
as always real.]
The result, therefore, would seem to be: where one nation is
granting about as many and as valuable favors as any other, the
unconditional form is the better; if this is not the case, then the
conditional form is the better. The equality in the distribution of
favors would come about only when all the nations in the system
were pursuing substantially the same policy. Therefore, the general
rules would seem to be: where the same policy is being pursued by
all the members of the group, the unconditional form is the better;
where different policies are being pursued, the unconditional form
does not work evenly and tends to produce dissatisfaction; where
there is an active conflict between two policies, the unconditional
clause does not work at all, and the use of the conditional form of the
clause is called for.
The introduction and rise of the conditional form of the clause
was due to the actual occurrence in practice of the last of these
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situations: an attempt by the United States to break down the im-
possible tariffs and ironclad monopolies which the mercantile system,
then at its height, had established in Europe. 8 For the first two
hundred years of its existence the clause was purely unconditional.'9
There had been occasional crude quasi-most favored nation clauses
in antiquity,20 and a few among the commercial cities of the Mediter-
ranean during the Middle Ages," but the clause did not come into
any sort of regttar use until the seventeenth century, with the rise
of the mercantile system, and the bitter competition for trade and
colonies that it brought in.22 All the nations of Europe whose
interest in trade had been sufficidnt to put most favored nation clauses
in their treaties were pursuing the same policy: that is, getting all the
colonies they could, establishing monopolies in them, and erecting
prohibitive barriers against the rest of the world. Consequently, the
unconditional form of the clause, since it would operate equally on
all of them, was the proper form of the clause for them, and it was
the form that was used. Of course, it would be carrying theory to
an unreasonable extreme to suppose that there was any such idea
actually in the minds of the negotiators of those early treaties.
Most probably, since the commercial treaties had really little to do
with commerce, but nearly always followed or preceded a war or a
royal marriage, or something of the sort, no one thought about the
form at all. Consequently, the clause was put into crude forms,
differing widely with each treaty, with no purpose except that it
should secure against discrimination. The result was that the
clauses were all unconditional, or rather, nonconditional, since all
the primitive forms of the clause are short and simple. Since all the
nations were pursuing the same commercial policy, the unconditional
clause worked very well; there being no fault to find with it, there
was no attempt to improve upon it, and by 1775 it had become so
crystallized, that anything but an unconditional clause was un-
thinkable.
"
8CULBERTSON, op. cit. supra note I, Ch. I & II; Page, The Earlier Commercial
Policy of the United States, (1902), 10 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY i61;
RABBENO, THE AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY (1895); TAUSSIG, TARIFF HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1900).
19"Wir konnten so vieler handelspolitischer Abmaehungen des I8. Jahr-
hunderts mit der Meistbegfinstigungsklausel habhaft werden, dass wir glauben,
man dfufe das I8. Jahrhundert das Jahrhundert der unbedingten Meistbegins-
tingung bezeichnen." GLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 24.20A complete collection of these treaties is to be found in VON SCALA, STAATS-
VERTRAGE DES ALTERTUMS (j898); a shorter account in WALKER, HISTORY OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS (1899); and a good account for the period after Justinian
in HEYD, HISTOIRE DE COMMERCE DU LEVANT AU MOYEN-AGE (1886). See also
I ]Kings 20:34.2 Cavaretta, op. cit. supra note I, 59. 22Supra note I9.
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When the United States entered the circle of nations, however, it
brought with it an entirely new attitude toward commercial and
international relations. It was the first of the new nations--nations
of large territories, unlimited supplies of agricultural products and
raw materials, but of no manufactures to speak of. It, therefore,
depended almost entirely on Europe for its manufactured goods.
In order to be able to pay for them, of course, American products
had to be shipped to the manufacturing countries. These were
chiefly raw materials and agricultural products. But the European
nations, firmly set in the mercantilist doctrines which ruled at that
time, had erected formidable barriers against all sorts of imports,
in favor of the monopolies granted in their own colonies. It was
extremely hard for the United States to market its products in
Europe and extremely hard to get a balance with which to pay for
the European manufactures. Its policy, therefore, was to break
down these barriers as much as possible-rather a startling object
when the present policy of the United States is considered. The only
way this could be done was to negotiate reciprocity treaties, to trade
reduction for reduction. In that way the walls might be gradually
broken down, and American products would stand a fair chance.
But we were dealing with eight or ten nations. Not one of them
would reduce anything of its own accord, and purchase was the only
possibility. If an unconditional form of the most favored nation
clause were used, the United States would have to extend to all, the
favors she extended to each. If we had wanted to get England's
tariff as low as possible, we would have had to give to her as great
reductions as we received. If England reduced her tariff to nothing
by an agreement with us, we would have to do the same. All the other
nations with whom each of us dealt would receive all the favors
England or the United States gave each other, and the result would
be that neither country would have more favors to grant, and the
rest of the world would still have their barriers as high as ever. In
practice, however, it would be more likely that the United States
would get favors from all the countries, so that the result of the
sacrifice of all of our tariff would produce but a ten per cent reduction
in the tariffs of each of the other ten nations of the system.
No question arose as to the fairness of the unconditional clause in
theory, nor was there any question of discrimination. The clause
would not work in the circumstances. The United States wanted
favors granted by all, and the rest of the world was content if no
favors at all were granted. The only effective policy from an Ameri-
can point of view was useless, for there would be no chance to even
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the balance by securing freely favors granted by the European
nations among themselves, for there would be no such favors. In
short, at the time, the unconditional most favored nation clause was
unworkable for the United States.
To meet this situation, it was necessary to devise a way to make
each of the European nations pay the full consideration for every
favor-so that the United States might compel every nation in most
favored nation relationship with it to lower its rates for the United
States as the United States lowered its rates for it. The conditional
form was the result of this need.
The first of the conditional clauses was put into the treaty of 1778
with France.2 It was of the typical form which later became known
as the standard American conditional clause. It marks the beginning
of a new period in the history of the clause as a whole, and furnishes
the basis for future divisions, for the remainder of the history of the
clause may be divided into periods according to the attitude of the
world toward the conditional form of the clause. From 1778 to
1825 the United States alone used the conditional form as a policy;
between 1825 and i86o, firstthe Spanish-American republics and then
the great majority of European states adopted the conditional form;
after i86o all the world abandoned the practice of a conditional
most favored nation policy, but the United States still defended it in
theory; in 1922 even the name was dropped.
During the first period the United States managed to get conditional
clauses into its commercial treaties with France, Sweden, Prussia,
the Netherlands and the Barbary States; and contended also that all
the rest of the nonconditonal clauses she had negotiated were to be
construed as conditional.24 At the same time she pursued'the con-
templated policy, very much the same sort of policy that is now
being pursued with regard to naval disarmament: established a high
tariff to show what could be done if necessary, and then offered to
lower it to anyone who would reciprocate. There were no startling
results, of course, but there seems to be no doubt that the policy was
rather successful and did a great deal to advance the cause of liberal-
ism in trade. 5
After 1820 the Spanish American states began to revolt, and when
their governments were set up, the United States was taken more or
less as a model. Consequently, a great many American peculiarities
23Supra page 7 and note 13.21There were six expressly conditional clauses; three equivocal clauses; and four
nonconditional clauses, three of them with Great Britain. All of them were
construed by the American State Department to be conditional.
nSupra note i9.
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were reproduced in South American governmental matters, among
which was the American attitude toward the most favored nation
clause. Of course, many of the same reasons for the use of the
conditional form of the clause which had induced its adoption by the
United States, existed in the case of the South American States, but
it seems very doubtful that any of them influenced the South Ameri-
can attitude, for they never appeared to understand the clause, and
never defended their policy with regard to it.
With all these nations using the conditional form, and successfully
as far as liberalizing tariff restrictions was concerned; and with the
rise of sentiment for freer trade in Europe itself, the less conservative
countries of Europe began to consider the conditional form of the
clause. Beginning about 1835, and spreading very rapidly, the
conditional form soon was in the overwhelming majority, all of
Europe except the traditionally conservative Great Britain and
Scandinavia accepting it.2 The result of this was, naturally, to put
all the nations in the same category again. Instead of the United
States being alone in the world, all the world but England and
Scandinavia were with her, and even they had begun to adopt a
liberal policy.27 Therefore, the unconditional clause became desirable
again. England, who had gone much further than any of the other
countries once she got started, had absolute free trade, and was
becoming embarrassed by the use of the conditional clause; for with
free trade, she had no favors left with which to negotiate, and was
not being well treated. She threw all her influehce into making the
clause unconditional, and since the time was just right for such an
attempt, she succeeded. After the first unconditional clause, in the
Cobden Treaty between England and France in i86o, a literal flood
of unconditional treaties swept the conditional form out of practical
existence. The United States still adhered to it, and the more
supine of the Spanish American states followed suit, but it was gone
in all but name. Even the United States abandoned its practice;
for since i86o at least, the United States has had but a single tariff-
which is only another way of granting unconditional most favored
nation treatment, since all nations receive the same treatment,
whether they pay for the opportunity of being equal or not.
Just before the World War, however, the situation was becoming
21Of seventy-seven European commercial treaties of this period, of sufficient
importance to be listed, sixty were conditional. Glier; op. cit. supra note i,
Oh. VIII, p. 92-129.27Three of Great Britain's ten treaties are conditional, and Sweden had one
such clause, in her treaty with Greece in 1836. Between 1845 and 185o the
traditional British free trade policy became fully established.
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embarrassing. Since the United States .was in fact practicing un-
conditional most favored nation treatment, the other nations were
willing to let well enough alone and ignored the conditional form of
the most favored nation clauses in their American treaties. But the
United States had been annoying the world for some time with a
series of tariff provisions which violated every known form of the
most favored nation clause-geographical discriminations, penalty
duties, etc.-and further, was beginning to be a formidable commercial
rival to many of the European countries. It began to look, therefore,
as though someone might turn the conditional form of its clauses
against the United States for a change, for during the century pre-
ceding, the American State Department had by some remarkable
arguments shown that it was possible to deny any or all, claims
under a conditional clause arbitrarily. Arguments had been de-
velopd that would shut out anything. After the War, the United
States realized that only circumstances had saved her from annoying
results from forms of her clauses, that any nation who felt a little
spite could make things embarrassing, and that the circumstances
which had formerly protected her were not likely to continue much
longer. Therefore, in 1922, -the conditional policy was definitely
abandoned, and an aggressively unconditional policy inaugurated. A
considerable number of new unconditional agreements have been
negotiated, and more are in progress of negotiation all the time.28
It might seem now that, with no nation on earth supporting the
conditional form, it has become extinct and is gone forever; and such
is the attitude of most of the writers on the clause. This appears,
however, to be a little optimistic. In 1913 it would have seemed
incredible that barter should assume the position of importance it
did in Germany and Russia in less than ten years; however, we know
28The following treaties, all of which were considered by the United States to
be conditional, were in force in 1914: Argentine, 1853; Austria, 1829; Belgium,
1875; Bolivia, x858; China, 1903; Colombia, 1846; Costa Rica, 1851; Congo, I89I;
Denmark, 1826; Ethiopia, 19o3; Great Britain, 1815; Egypt, x884; Greece, 1837;
Hanseatic Republics, 1827; Honduras, 1864; Italy, 1871; Japan, I9II; Ottoman
Empire, 1830; Paraguay, 1859; Persia, 1856; Portugal, I9IO; Prussia, 1828;
Sweden and Norway, 1827; Siam, 1856; Tonga, 1886; Tripoli, 1805; and Morocco,
1837. A recognized unconditional treaty, with Serbia in 1881, was also in force,
and still is. Two other unconditional treaties, with Switzerland in 185o and the
Orange Free State in 1871, were abrogated, the first by the United States and
the second by the absorption of the Orange Free State into the British Empire.
After I922, the aggressively unconditional policy resulted in three treaties: with
Germany and Hungary in June 1924, and with Turkey in August 1923, of which
only the German treaty has been ratified to date. There are also nine uncon-
ditional most favored nation agreements with various countries concluded by
note: with Brazil, Oct. 1923; Czechoslovakia, Oct. 1923; Nicaragua, June 1924;
Guatemala, Aug. 1924; Poland, Feb. 1925; Finland, May 1925; Esthonia, Aug.
1925; and Rumania, Feb. 1926.
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that it happened. It is at least possible that a time will come in the
history of the world when the affairs of nations will be in the same
position in which they were in 178o. When that time comes, there
may be another period when the conditional form of the clause will
be used. It will never be anything more than a temporary expedient,
for one of its peculiarities is that, like the honey-bee which is supposed
to sting once and die, the conditional clause is destroyed by its own
success-its purpose is to make commercial policies uniform, and
when those policies are uniform, it cannot exist. The conditional
clause is gone now: it may never come back, and if it does it will not
stay; but it is not dead-only dormant.
The record of the American State Department in its interpretation
of the most favored nation clause and its conduct of the debates
over interpretation is nothing to point to with pride, either from the
standpoint of legal soundness of the arguments advanced, or from
the standpoint of good faith and willingness to fulfill its promises.
Its use and defense of the expressly conditional form of the clause is
easily explicable and perfectly justified, as we have seen; the actual
cases, however, have not dealt with the express clauses-they are so
clear and provide so unmistakably for the ends desired that no
question could arise. The disputes have all been over indefinite
forms of the clause, and the status of tariff provisions framed to
discriminate without actually violating the letter of the most favored
nation clause.
It seems safe to say that the United States has been in the wrong,
if not technically, at least morally, in nearly all the disputes which
have been raised over interpretation of an indefinite most favored
nation clause. The first, most important, and really the only well
contested debate on this subject was that over the eighth article of
the Louisiana Cession Treaty of 1803.29 The text of the clause is as
follows:
Art. VIII: In future and forever after the expiration of the
twelve years all ships of France shall be treated upon the footing
of the most favored nation in the ports above mentioned.
The ports mentioned were those of Louisiana, and at the end of the
twelve years English ships were paying no duties at all in New
Orleans, and French ships were paying very high duties-due to a
treaty concluded in 1815 with Great Britain which provided for
reciprocal national treatment of shipping. France immediately
29Supra note 9.
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
protested, and her claim was denied on the ground that favors
granted for an equivalent-reciprocity in this case-did not come
within the provisions of the most favored nation clause. This was
the first time such a contention had ever been put forward, and
France was unprepared; but the question was debated well, and
lasted for fourteen years. There is a tremendous amount of cor-
respondence, 30 but the American argument boils down to the defini-
tion of the word "favor," which we discussed above, and the French
argument comes in the end to the same point. The United States
contended that a favor meant an advantage rendered gratuitously
without compensation; that a bargain or a sale was not a favor; that
the advantage here in question was not a favor, but a bargain or a
sale; that therefore England was not favored; and that France could
not claim the advantage on the ground that England was being more
favored than herself. The French argument also goes to the mean-
ing of "most favored nation treatment." It is perhaps best expressed
in M. de Neuville's own words '
"Is there then but one way of obtaining the right to.be so
treated? ... Upon consulting the various treaties entered into
with European powers I find in almost all of them a definition of
what is meant by being treated upon the footing of the most
favored nations and these definitions are so precise that I do not
see how any controversies can arise on that point. In most cases
relating to the rights and privileges of the most favored nations
the parties even go on to explain that the favor shall be free
if freely granted to another nation or upon granting the same
compensation if the concession be conditional. From which I
conclude that a right to be treated upon the footing of the most
favored nation may be enjoyed in two ways, either gratuitously
or conditionally .... The conventional law of nations admits
particularly in the United States, that this treatment may be
obtained not only gratuitously but conditionally .... France
has a right to enjoy ... the treatment of the most favored nation,
whether this nation be favored gratuitously or conditionally...."
From a strictly logical point of view, the American interpretation
is legally more sound; if not, it is at least equally sound. But the
use of such an argument in the circumstances was not very honorable:
for the United States knew that for over, two hundred years all the
nations of the earth had been interpreting such languiage in a directly
opposite manner; and they must have known that when the treaty
was concluded, the French negotiators had the opposite interpretation
3OAMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol. V., p. i5o et seq., 64o
et seq.
$MA ERICAN STATE PAPERS, ]FOREIGN RELATIONS, V:17I.
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in mind, and thought that the clause provided for unconditional most
favored nation treatment. The State Department seems guilty of a
clear breach of faith, either in negotiating a treaty when they knew
its wording was deceiving the other party, or in advancing such an
argument to get out of a promise contracted in good faith.32
In 1831 a claim of Austria was denied,n but this seems to have
been proper, for the clause was expressly conditional. Several times,
when claims were made under expressly conditional clauses, the
justice of counter-claims for the equivalent was recognized-for
instance, with Colombia in I826,14 and with Nicaragua in I872. 3'
In 1875 the United States and Hawaii agreed to give each other
certain reciprocal advantages in the matter of tariff rates, and Hawaii
promised not to grant the same advantages to any other nations on
any terms." Most of the European nations protested, and quite a
number of disputes arose from it. On the Hawaiian side, the most
serious dispute was with Great Britain, who claimed under a clause
with expressly conditional form. 37 The claim was properly refused
when it was for an unconditional extension of the reductions, but
Great Britain modified her demands and asked only for the oppor-
tunity to get the reductions by paying the same price the United
States had paid. This placed Hawaii in a dilemma, since she had
then to break either her American Treaty by complying, or her
English treaty by refusing. The United States stood pat, but
Hawaii was able to compromise with Great Britain, admitting the
justice of the British position, but securing enough discriminations
to satisfy the United States. Though the United States was within
her legal rights safely enough, her conduct in inducing Hawaii to
break her contract with Great Britain cannot be looked on as very
ethical.
The United States itself became involved directly in a number of
32CULERTSON, op. cit. supra note I, 65; HEROD, op. cit. supra note I, 8-27;
HORNBECK, op. cit. supra note I, 31; VISSER, op. Cit. supra note I, 273.
z3House Ex. Doc. No. 176, 22nd Cong., 2nd Sess.34House Ex. Doc. No. 144, 19th Cong., Ist Sess. See also, 5 MOORE, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (19o6), 260.
3 5FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1873, P. 743.36Art. I: For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by his
Majesty in the next succeeding article of this convention and as an equivalent
therefor the United States of America hereby agrees to admit all the articles
named in the following schedule, the same being the growth and produce of the
Hawaiian Islands into the ports of the United States free of duty.
Art. II: identical, mnutatis mutandis.
Art. V: It is agreed, on the part of his Hawaiian Majesty that so long as this
treaty remains in force, he will not grant any favor... nor make any treaty by
which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges relative to admission of
articles free of duty hereby secured to the United States.37Great Britain-Hawaii, Treaty of 1851, Arts. III and IV.
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disputes over the discriminations made by this Hawaiian reciprocity
agreement, among which are the only two cases in which the question
of the interpretation of the most favored nation clause has been before
the Supreme Court. Most of the European nations immediately
demanded for their nations the favors we had granted to Hawaii,
which were mainly the abolition of duty on sugar. The United States
denied them all on the grounds, first, that the favors were granted
for a consideration and were not to be extended except for considera-
tion; and second, that since part of the consideration was "love and
affection" (that is, geographical and political propinquity), no other
nation could hope to render an equivalent, and therefore the reduc-
tions would not be extended to any other nation.3 8 Since none of
the other nations were willing to extend the equivalent, this last
statement is pure dictum; but even as dictum, it is absolutely inde-
fensible, since it would totally destroy all the effect and benefit of the
clause if a nation could say that not even by rendering all the
equivalent in its power could another nation hope to extend a favor
granted to a third.
The two cases referred to above are Bartram v. Robertson, 9 and
Whitney v. Robertson,40 in both of which the American reduction on
Hawaiian sugar was claimed, in the first for Danish sugar from St.
Croix, and in the second for sugar from San Domingo. The decision
in the Bartram case seems to be correct, for there is an expressly
conditional clause in the treaty relied on, and Denmark had not
offered the requisite equivalent. In the Whitney case, however, the
treaty relied on contained no expressly conditional clause, but only
a nonconditional clause promising that no higher duties would be
levied on Dominican products than on the products of any other
country. The Supreme Court denied the claim on the broad ground
that no advantages obtained by an equivalent came within the
provisions of any form of the most favored nation clause, relying on
Bartram v. Robertson. But since that case had been decided on, and
was justifiable on, the ground only that a conditional clause controlled
a nonconditional clause in the same treaty, the holding that it made
no difference whether a conditional clause was present or not, was not
only indefensible from the standpoint of principle, but ignored the
basis of the decision which the same court had made in the Bartram
case only two years before.
The final dispute over this phase of the interpretation of the clause
385 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) 263.
39122 U. S. 116, 7 Sup. Ct. I 15 (1886).
40124 U. S. 19o, 8 Sup. Ct. 456 (1887).
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occurred in 1898 with Switzerland, over the clauses in her treaty of
i85o.41 They were four in number, the first of which provided for
most favored nation treatment as defined in the subsequent articles,
and the rest of which defined most favored nation treatment as
unconditional. The United States refused to recognize even such a
clause as unconditional, and was not going to allow the claim, until
the Swiss Government was able to show from the record of the negoti-
ations leading up to the treaty, that both sides had intended the
treaty to be unconditional. But the United States, though yielding,
immediately abrogated the treaty.
Another questionable decision arose from this case, for when
Switzerland obtained these reductions freely under her unconditional
clause, other nations claimed the favor given Switzerland, under their
conditional clauses. The United States admitted that technically
they were perhaps right, but that this Swiss case was an exception-
the first favor the United States had ever freely to grant--and that
therefore it should be considered such an exception that no most
favored nation claims could be advanced on it.2 This seems to be
equivalent to saying that when a nation is so careful not to give
anything away as the United States had been, when something is
given away, it must be treated as an act of God.
The attitude of the United States in interpreting the clause as not
applying to cases in which there have been attempts to discriminate
in fact without actually violating the letter of the clause, is no more
commendable. There are several forms of these discriminations, and
the United States has been guilty of using and defending all of them,
especially the two most flagrant: geographical discriminations, and
penalty duties.
The substance of a geographical discrimination is that it provides
a certain rate of duties from all ports and countries within a certain
district, and another rate for the rest of the world.43 Norway tried
such a plan in 1828,4 her navigation law of that year providing one.
tonnage tax for European ports outside the Mediterranean, another
for Mediterranean ports, and a third for the rest of the world, the
duties increasing with the distance. The United States protested
that both American navigation and American products, which would
have to be shipped in vessels paying higher taxes, were being dis-
415 MOORE, DIGEST (1906), 283. See also HORNBECK, Op. cit. supra note i, 33;
UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, -Op. cit. sup'a note I, 428; VINER, Op. cit..
supra note I, 120.
4Supra note 41.4
aCULBERTSON, op. Cit. supra note i, 76.
44FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES, 1887, 1038-1053.
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- criminated against, and, after some debate, Norway recognized that
the United States' contention was sound, and repealed the offending
provision. Eight years later England imposed a duty on rice at one
rate from Africa, and at a much greater rate from the rest of the
world. The United States again protested, and it was again conceded
that the United States was right.45 In i88o, however, the United
States established tw-o districts for the payment of the tonnage tax,
from one of which, including North and Central America, the rate
was to be three cents a ton, and from the rest of the world, six cents
a ton.46 Practically all the nations of the world protested against
this, but the United States absolutely denied that there was any
discrimination, since all vessels coming from a single port, no matter
what the nationality, would be treated alike. The absolute un-
tenability of this quibble is apparent without argument, but the
United States adhered to it, and refused any relief. The State
Department did, it is true, recognize that since Norway had in
exactly'the same circumstances and under the same treaty, conceded
the same position to the United States which she was now demanding
from the United States, it was in honor bound to give in to Norway
at least. The Commissioner of Navigation, who alone had the
authority to lower the tax, was not interested in the honor of the
State Department, and refused to modify it.
47
The provisions for penalty duties prescribe an increase of duties
on products from countries which refuse to do some positive act
in favor of the United States.48 The Tariff Act of 189o contains
a good' example of this form of discrimination: it provides that the
duties on certain products shall be reduced, but shall be maintained
on the'products of any country whose tariff level the President deems
mutually'unequal and unreasonable; and the substance of which is
that the President may authorize discriminations against countries
Which have too high a tariff level, even though there is no hint of
-"discrimination against the United States.49 In short, the act provided
S'that in case the American government disapproved of the domestic
'fiscal- policy of a country, it could consider itself relieved from the
obligations :6f the most favored nation clause. Of course, there was
a g6od legal argument to justify the contention: the possession of
4
.House Ex. Doc. No. 278, 28th Cong., Ist Sess. HEROD, op. Cit. slapra, note I,
70. fJn2446Act of June 24, 1884, Sec. 14.
47Opinions of the Attorneys General, 18:26o and 18:382. Also House Ex. Doc.
No. 74, 5oth Cong., 2nd Sess.48CULBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 1, 79 et seg.; HORNBECK, Op. Cit. supra note i,
87; mcCLURE, op. cit. supra note I, 144; VISSER, op. Cit. supra note I, 276.
49Tariff Act of 189o, Sec. 3.
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what the President considered a reasonable tariff (ours was one of the
most unreasonable on earth at the time) was a condition attached
to the favor of receiving the reduction; the United States was willing
to grant the favor on compliance with the condition, just as it was
always willing to grant favors purchased for a consideration on the
extension of a like consideration. Colombia and Haiti, whose in-
ternal condition required high tariffs for revenue, were proscribed;
they protested vigorously, but were denied. 0 The fact was that
half a dozen nations were receiving more favorable tariff treatment
than these two countries, and had received it freely, without either
consideration or negotiation on their part. How such a favor could
be withheld from Colombia or Haiti, therefore, with either a condition-
al or an unconditional clause, is impossible to understand. The
United States did not attempt to explain it: Colombia and Haiti
were too small to cause any trouble in any event.
Germany was held up with about the same sort of gun--a provision
that salt would be admitted duty free from countries which admitted
American salt free." Germany had a small tax on salt exactly equal
to her domestic excise tax on German produced and consumed salt.
We demanded that she repeal this tax or be discriminated against
here: practically a demand that she purchase equal treatment in
our ports by discriminating against her own industries. We had to
argue to sustain this contention, but the German claim was denied.
The transaction was, of course, in flagrant violation of the most
favored nation clause, and has never been defended, even in the
United States."
Countervailing duties on bounty-fed products-that is, the
imposition on products from countries which paid bounties on such
products of a duty exactly equal to and countervailing the bounty-
seem also to be within the operation of the most favored nation
clause, since they clearly provide for different rates of tariff from
different countries, depending entirely on the domestic and internal
policy of that country. But since bounties are generally highly
undesirable, and since countervailing duties seem to be the only
feasible means of stopping such dumping, there is a practical justifi-
5O0Herrera, who was Minister to the United States from Colombia, devotes a
whole chapter to this incident. See also CULBERTSON, op. cit. supra note I, 76;
McCLuRE, op. cit. supra note I, 182; UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, Op.
cit. supra note I, 422.
GTariff Act of 1894, Paragraph 6o8, Free List.
62 CULBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 1, 79; HORNBECK, op. cit. supra note 1, 87;
McCLURE, op. cit. s-uPra note I, 144; UNITED STATES TARIFF COMSnSION, Op.
cit. supra, note 1, 428; VINER, op. cit. supra note 1, 118; VISSER, Op. Cit. supra
note I, 276. See also Mr. Oney's opinion; 21 Opinions of the Attorneys General,
8o, 82.
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cation for them. Many other nations have defended their use,
especially Great Britain, on grounds of practical necessity.5
Two other forms of discrimination-minute classification in tariff
schedules, so that the goods from one country fall into one class, and
essentially the same product from another country into another;
and the imposition of prohibitions on the importation of certain
articles, supposedly on sanitary grounds, but really to stifle com-
petition-are equally reprehensible, but they cannot very well be
reached by the most favored nation clause, since there is absolutely
no discrimination on the face of the provisions. The discrimination
is furnished by extrinsic circumstances. But the attitude of the
United States toward these provisions has been very good. Of
course it has used them a little, but not nearly to the extent Europe
has, for the European nations seem to confine their discriminations
and violations of the clause to the more subtle and elusive methods.
On the whole it may be said that, though the original introduction
of the conditional form was justified, the American interpretations
of conditional clauses, and indeed its interpretation of the clause
under any circumstances, has been marked too often by bad faith,
and by a tendency to evade any promise whatever on the subject.
A more liberal policy has been evidenced since 1923, however, and
it is to be hoped that the change is permanent. It is also to be
hoped that the United States may adhere to the World Court, whose
jurisdiction of such disputes would go a long way toward preventing
any future discriminations, and keeping the United States from
any temptation to rely on its great strength to the disadvantage of
smaller nations.
5CULBERTSON, op. cit. supra note I, 73; VISSER, op. cit. supra note I, 167.
See also KAUFMAN, WELTZUCKERINDUSTRIE (1904); Sheaperd, 8 JOURNAL OF
COmPARATIVE LEGISLATION, (N. S.) 231 (i9oi). A report of a conference on the
subject is to be found in the Blue Book (Great Britain), C. 5577 (1888).
